Participatory, Democratic, Elitist and Authoritarian Strands and Trends in Tanzania: A Sketch by Green, Reginald H.
iHdZ t i auv&cx, 6y\¿/1
C m v V c m a c ^  : _ P  ( O r ^ \ a z >  X k .
PARTICIPATORY, DEMOCRATIC, ELLITIST AND AUTHORITARIAN STRANDS 
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By Reginald Herbold Green
The purpose of society is man; but in order to serve man 
there must be a social organisation of economic activities' 
which is conducive to the greater production of things 
useful for the material and spiritual welfare of man.
This means it may well be a function of society to organise 
and sustain efficient economic organisation and production 
techniques even when these are in themselves unpleasant 
or restrictive.
- President Julius K. Nyerere
Development means liberation. Any action that gives /the 
people/ more control of their own affairs is an action for 
development, even if it does not offer them better health 
or more bread.
- Party Mwongozo (Guidelines)
Our own reality - however fine and attractive the reality 
of others may be - can only be transformed by detailed 
knowledge of it, by our own effort, by our own sacrifices . . .
- Amilcar Cabral, late President PAIGC 
Mistakes are mistakes.
- President Julius K. Nyerere
If the people are to develop they must have power. They 
must be able to control their own activities within the 
framework of their village communities ... At present the 
best intentioned governments - my own included - too 
readily move from a conviction of the need for rural develop­
ment into acting as if the people had no ideas of their own. 
This is quite wrong ... people do know what their basic 
needs are ... if they have sufficient freedom they can be 
relied upon to determine their own priorities of development.
- President Julius K. Nyerere
Tanzanian^Political Commitments and Continuity: An Overview 
Tanzania is a relatively large (18 million people, 900,000 square 
kilometres), quite poor (among the 30 least developed) nation.
Its history is marked by substantial political continuity over the 
past quarter century (including the pre-independence mobilisation 
as prologue) and a fairly clearly defined set of political 
standards and goals.
« .
The main political commitments of the governing sole party (Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi - Revolutionary Party - formed in 1977 by the merger 
of mainland Tanzania's TANU and Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party) are:
a. transition to a socialist (not "African socialist") mode of 
production and pattern of social/production relations;
b. broad participation in political, economic and social life 
including decision taking with decisions and implementation 
substantially decentralised;
c. democratic participation including contested elections, a rule 
of law and a variety of channels of access to decision takers 
(or redressors);
d. egalitarianism in respect to incomes, access to basic services 
and ability to participate;
e. self-reliance (nationally and communally) as an intellectual 
and organising principle and as an operational goal;
f. rapid increase in the level of productive forces (6% a year) 
combined with economic restructuring to increase self-reliance 
and interdependence;
g. universal access to basic services (ie primary and adult 
education, pure water, preventative and basic curative 
medicine);
h. universal access to a socially acceptable level of personal 
cosnumption through adequately productive and fairly enough 
remunerated employment or self-employment.
There has been substantial evolution of these goals - their pre­
independence formulations by TANU were distinctly vague and 
ambiguous. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 (slightly over five 
years after independence) was a substantial reformulation in 
tighter, more realistic and more operational terms. Its first
steps included substantial nationalisations (securing public sector
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dominance in finance, external trade and manufacturing), rigorous 
separation of state - public enterprise - party leaders from 
private economic activity and major emphasis on Tanzanian intellec­
tual, ideological and material effort toward self-reliance. The 
stress on participation became co-equal in the 1971 Guidelines.
While there has been a continuous evolution of forms, particular 
policies and emphasis before and after 1967 and 1971, the post-1971 
pattern is clearly one of building, and refining rather than of 
basically reformulating. Given the existence both of significant 
sub-class tensions and of varying domestic and external objective 
challenges, there have also been fairly substantial variations in 
which principles received central attention at any point in time.
CCM (including TANU) has remained a mass (albeit not an open entry) 
party with substantial popular support and mobilising ability and 
increasing dominance over public policy for over a quarter-centurv. 
Tanzania has achieved relatively rapid increases in national co­
hesiveness, access to basic services (eg 80% adult literacy), per 
capita production and economic restructuring,and a substantial - 
if perhaps much more uneven and problematic - advance in broad 
participation. It has done so from an initially fragile national 
base (there was no dominant pre-colonial state), one of the 
lowest pre-independence productive force bases - even in Africa, 
in an international economic context which has often (especially 
1974-76 and 1979 to date) been unfavourable, and despite need for 
national or collective action to guard against/repel armed 
aggression in every year since 1970.
That Tanzania's economic and political system are facing the most 
severe set of crises since independence is a fact.^ T^e impact of
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that crisis on the continuity and ability to maintain priorities 
of the political system remains problematic. What is surprising 
is not the severity of the strains and the numerous secondary 
erosions of aspirations and standards, but that the political and 
economic systems remain basically functional with, at most, tactical 
retreats from goals (not including any substantial increase in 
authoritarianism).
Some Problems of Research and Analysis
Tanzanian political and social analysis suffers from several con­
straints. One is a distinct tendency - at all levels - to tell 
the questioner what the answerer thinks he wants to hear - the 
"Ndio, bwana" - "Yes, boss” pattern. Because most researchers are 
seen as "authority figures" by peasants and workers, this affects
3answers to radical critics almost as much as to main-line officials.
Because the Party and government decision-taking is substantially 
decentralised, systematic data collection and interpretation is 
difficult. This is exacerbated by the fact that most meetings are 
not open,and while neither the content of meetings nor of decisions 
is usually secret, public coverage is very fragmentary and collec­
tion by interview very tedious. For non-Swahili speakers and 
non-Tanzanians these difficulties are exacerbated.
Macro-analysis on many topics necessarily rests on inadequate 
micro-bases. Therefore, there is a tendency to use quite real 
cases which fit an author's thesis and to suppress equally real 
ones which are inconsistent, because which is representative is, 
under present data conditions,necessarily to a substantial degree 
a matter or judgement.
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A further problem is the quantity of analysis which sets up goals
for Tanzania attributed to Tanzanians and tests performance against
them, when these goals bear little resemblence to those of signifi-
4cant Tanzanian institutions or sub-classes.
Political Economic Ideology - The Main Line CCM Position 
The initial TANU political economic ideology was probably dominantly 
nationalist, populist and anti-colonialist. The leaders' commit­
ments to bourgois democracy and social democracy (in Scandinavian
5more than British or German terms) were not necessarily understood 
in detail by the mass membership. A significant strand was a 
widely held belief that the Christian gospel did support both 
self-determination and greater equality. As this was not a reading 
supported by the majority of Church hierarchies, more articulated 
Christian-based positions - eg, the very deep left Catholic (pre­
liberation theology) elements in President Nyerere's thought were 
also relatively rare.
Marxian elements - at least in a recognisably articulated form -
were not very evident in mainstream TANU thinking before 1967.
Their minority proponents were not significantly involved in TANU1s
transition to a basically Marxian position - indeed the most signi-
£
ficant bitterly opposed it. The tone of the Arusha Declaration and 
Mwongozo is clearly Marxian, and subsequent major speeches (not 
only of the President) are even more so, albeit with a distinct 
predilection for a broadly understandable style of presentation and 
a certain avoidance both of elaborate specialised language and,
7usually, of posing domestic sub-class contradictions m  terms 
which would heighten antagonism.
♦ o
The non-standard terminology, for a socialist party, has three
g
reasons: first, as noted, broad intelligibility ; second, a belief 
that socialism in Africa must re-examine sequences, contexts and 
possibilities, not copy European or Asian ones; third, a relatively 
late - and not necessarily very wide - reading of Marx, Engels,
Lenin, Mao and Gramsci. There has never been a main-line belief 
that European and Asian socialist state policy and experience could 
be imported wholesale, nor that any one Communist or Socialist 
party or thinker had a monopoly on wisdom. Equally, there has 
never been a belief that the principles and goals of socialism were 
so different in Africa that "African socialism" (as opposed to 
"socialism in Africa") was a valid goal, rather than either a self­
mystification or a cover terminology for variations on dependent 
c a p i t a l i s m . P a r t i c u l a r l y  in respect to the Arusha Declaration, 
the nationalist and socialist strands interacted. The goal of 
economic self-determination could not - on the 1961-56 Tanzanian 
record and more general African experience - be pursued effectively 
under capitalism. Or as President Nyerere put it: "Capitalism
in Africa will not be African capitalism."
Ujamaa: Evolution Toward Socialism In Tanzania
Commentaries on Ujamaa (now the Swahili word for socilaism, albeit 
the previous use would more accurately have been rendered "extended 
familyhood" or "communalism") tend to be confusing and confused.
In part this relates to its evolution - President Nyerere1s 1962 
formulation was pre-Marxian and not in an operational (as opposed to 
a politically mobilising) form, whereas the 1967 and later overall 
(or articulated sectoral and strategic) formulations are Marxian and, 
in general, operationally oriented. To read them as if they were 
contemporaneous is not useful.
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It is fairly clearly true that Ujamaa is not Marxist-Leninist in 
the socialist European meaning of that term. In origin it is 
arguably "folk Marxist" and in evolution substantially more con­
cerned about current mass welfare and participation and the dangers 
of authoritarianism than the main lines of socialist European 
official ideology. In certain respects, it is therefore more 
similar to some aspects of Maoism.^ In particular, it is much 
more open to officially admitting ideological or strategic mistakes 
and sharply critical of using any text (whether of Marx or of 
Nyerere) as permanent revealed truth to be reinterpreted, rather 
than revised or rejected if it proves objectively unsound in the 
actual Tanzanian context.
Ujamaa in its appeal to elements in pre-colonial, pre-capitalist 
society is a "myth" in the technical meaning of that term. By 
citing elements of egalitarianism and redistribution, and of 
communal effort and social relations, and by contrasting them to 
capitalist/colonialist penetration and post-independence neo­
colonial dependence, it served as a mobilising and uniting theme. 
This was important both because up .to 1967 the colonial bias 
against Marxian thought still had substantial residual strength, 
and because the building up of broad support for a socialist 
orientation required that it be presented in terms intelligible 
and related both to the auditor'scommunal history and nationalist 
commitment.
Ujamaa - in its appeal to African social elements - has never been 
presented as historical analysis. Nor has there been any claim 
that the pre-colonial, pre-capitalist past could be replicated.
On the contrary, both technological and social changes are asserted 
to make any such romantic return to a "state of nature" impossible
and undesirable.
Ujamaa has at no point denied the existence of classes and sub­
classes - au contraire. However, the 1962 version could be read 
as denying the need for class or sub-class confrontation. That 
is clearly not a plausible reading of the Arusha Declaration or 
subsequent speeches, laws and actions. The nature of the contra­
dictions - antagonistic or not, and primary or not - and therefore 
of the appropriate forms and timing of confrontation,have been 
the topics of substantial intra-party debate (as well as by both 
left and right critics). The tactics have varied - eg, the massive
abrupt assault by nationalisation on landlords in 1971 vs the step
12by step breaking of neo-kulak group power over 1965-76.
Basic Elements - 1980's
There are a number of central themes in Ujamaa as it now exists, 
beyond transition to a socialist mode of production in terms of 
dominant public sector ownership (which is largely achieved). One 
is Tanzanian self-respect in terms of recognition of the validity 
of Tanzanian history and culture, and its ability to provide both 
continuity and creativity. The goal is increased self-perception 
and initiative both as the intellectual/cultural side of self- 
reliance and as the basis for self-mobilisation and self-discipline
Building a "non-market" set of organising principles is a second 
theme in the sense of rejecting the von Mises-von Hayek-Friedman 
mystical view of "the market" as a moral organising principle, 
not in that of any commitment to general material balances planning 
(In fact Tanzanian planning and public productive sector policy is 
managed-market oriented on lines broadly similar to those of 
Hungary.) Basic public services and basic household incomes (more
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accurately a context in which households can earn them) are seen 
as more important than maximising economic growth or accummulation, 
and as not adequately protected by market mechanisms. Human beings 
and their welfare - not pure productive force levels - are seen as
the only justification of socialism. In this respect, Ujamaa is
v 13inherently anti-economistic.
An acceptance of the validity of coercion after broad, participatory 
discussion leading to decisions - the example of vaccination was 
cited by the President as a parallel to the 1974-75 compulsory 
villageisation exercise, and the nationalisation and taxation 
measures (as well as those creating Workers Councils) are compulsory 
whatever else they may be. This is not seen as preventing re-opening 
a decision if events suggest such a course, but as a duty to comply 
with, and support it, so long as it is in force. This approach 
clearly has distinct elements of democratic centralism (or of 
British Cabinet collective responsibility) as well as of the partici- 
cipatory strands in traditional African political processes.
The dangers of exploitation (by capitalists, bureaucrats, party
officials, men - ie by men of women, urban wage earners - ie of
peasants) are a major theme in Ujamaa. As indicated, this is an
articulated theme and one which frequently leads to action (eg a
14rather draconic rural bias in incomes policy over 1975-81)
The need for discipline (to prevent exploitation and anarchy) and 
self-discipline (to achieve results and to reduce the "need" for 
authoritarian measures) has been handled frequently in both state­
ments and dialogue. Whether it has been articulated in a way 
synthesising the inherent tension between the two, and the different
implications in different social and production relations is much
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more problematic.
Efficiency has been stressed - in terms of progress toward objectives 
whether directly productive or not. This is, of course, not to 
claim it has always been achieved; the body of main line analysis 
and speeches criticising inefficiencies is very large. The point is 
that choice, allocation and avoidance of waste are primary objec­
tives. One of the President's more irate statements was that to 
equate waste with, or justify on the basis of, socialism, was a sin.
Raising the level and altering the structural makeup of productive 
forces is central in most main-line Ujamaa presentations. The "non- 
market" organising principles are seen as operational only if higher 
levels of material and service output are available, and both 
sustained growth and self-reliance as dependent on achieving a 
more integrated and oalanced structure of production and use. Much 
of the economic writing relating to production is, taken by itself, 
arguably not very closely integrated with, nor informed by, enough 
internalisation.of the other themes of Ujamaa.
Egalitarianism has been a central operational principle of Ujamaa 
- as well as one leading to some of the most severe attacks on it 
from left as well as right. The most readily quantifiable aspects 
relate to income distribution (eg with the maximum after tax income 
differential in the public sector now about 7.5% to 1 down from 
50 to 1 at independence). However, the egalitarian theme applies to 
basic services (primary education basically universal, 80% literacy 
and access to a health facility within walking distance, 55-65% 
access to pure water) and the ability to participate in decision- 
taking (where results are harder to quantify and progress both more
uneven and less rapid^) . This principle has informed not simply
tax, expenditure, wages and prices policies, but also many of the 
specific measures against exploitation and primary community struc­
tures (in respect to enterprises, governmental operations and the 
Party).
Anti-imperialism (or collective self-reliance) has been overtly 
present in almost all post-1969 formulations. One element has been 
self-defence (against Portugal, Uganda and others at home, and 
against Rhodesia and South Africa collectiv ely with Mozambique) . 
Another has been liberation - FRELIMO, MPLA, ZANU, ANC, UNIP, SWAPO 
have all at one time been based in Tanzania, "the bastion of 
liberation movements" as a Mozambican minister put it. Collective 
self-reliance has been pursued bilaterally (eg with Zambia and 
Mozambique), regionally (first in the East African Community, now 
primarily through the Front Line States, Southern African 
Coordination Conference and the Kagera Basin grouping), continental! 
(eg OAU, ECA) and globally (eg Non-Aligned, Group of 77).
Some Characteristics of Ujamaa in Praxis
Ujamaa has evolved - in responding to challenges, building on 
achievements and responding to crises. Accepting that mistakes can 
be made, need to be identified and should then be openly admitted 
as well as corrected, is a basic principle (albeit in practice a 
disputed one despite the President's example)- This is not to say 
that all evolution has been adequate or all mistakes promptly 
identified, admitted or corrected, but that evolution and mistake 
admission/correction are accepted principles in practice as well 
as on paper.
Emphasis has usually been on a limited number of antagonistic, 
secondary contradictions viewed as surmountable (synthesisable?)
at a particular time and providing a basis for subsequent advance. 
Limited resources (of personnel, mobilising capacity, decision- 
taking and analytical capacity even more than of money) require 
that most areas are treated as "pre-focal attention" (limiting prob­
lems or shoring up structures) or "post-focal attention" (raising 
micro-efficiency within the macro frame created by the synthesis).
This pattern necessarily creates an unbalanced strategy at any one 
point in time - or a spiral, not a "turnpike", path forward. The 
imbalances lead toward new focal area selection - sometimes 
returning to an area previously centred on a new context (better 
if the previous synthesis held but worse if it was initially 
misguided or succumbed to events).
The positive results of this strategic approach in basic services 
and most production sectors have been substantially limited by its 
inability - until 1980 at least - to identify import capacity (and 
therefore exports) as a strategic area. This seems to stem from 
the fact that technical input alone will not result in emphasis 
on a contradiction unless it is so perceived by a substantial 
number of political leaders, and that limited political conscious­
ness of priority and limited short-term technical possibilities
16tended over 1961-1979 to interact to downgrade export development.
A second problem is that in some cases the consolidation of micro­
efficiency stage has not followed the initial emphasis (eg acquired 
rental properties), has lost momentum (eg National Bank of Commerce 
in mid 1970's, Workers Councils over same period) or has gone into 
reverse (eg majority of Crop Authorities in late 1970's).
Counter Ideological Strands
Tanzanians - including some Tanzanian leaders - are by no means 
monolithic in support of the main-line Ujamaa ideological position. 
At least three authoritarian orientations can be identified: left, 
bureaucratic/managerial and right. All three are represented 
within the Party and state machinery, albeit substantial fractions 
of the first and third are overtly outside it, and the Party commit­
ment of the second is often more tactical and formal than real.
The left authoritarian position (sometimes characterised as produc­
tion socialist) has no real class or sub-class base. It is
primarily a stance of professional intellectuals and - therefore -
17rather well publicised. Over 1967-1970 the supporters of this 
position did have a substantial involvement in Party affairs as 
advisors. They spearheaded the call for a vanguard, exclusivist 
Party. Their expulsion over 1969-70 (well before Mwongozo) turned 
on their demand for leadership positions on the basis of ideological 
rectitude without submitting themselves to Party member (worker 
and peasant) selection. This was not in itself a left/right clash 
but a sharp reaction to self-proclaimed Platonic guardianship.
The "production socialist" strand opposed primary attention to 
basic services and to mass consumption standards, ie implicitly it 
supports a Mahalanobis model overall and - apparently - a neo- 
Stalinist rural strategy made more effective by converting peasants 
from "false consciousness" to support it. In general the "left 
authoritarian" approach would increase Party and managerial power 
but after purging most present Party and public sector figures 
whom it perceives as a compradore "new class". The stated commit­
ment to worker and peasant welfare is one to be defined and adminis­
tered by a "vanguard" until the present worker and peasant false 
consciousness if eradicated.
The bureaucratic/managerial authoritarian stance turns on efficiency, 
discipine and incentives. For these one can read giving management
a free hand, giving managers and officials back the power to rule
18workers and peasants, increasing the real incomes and other 
rewards of technocrats.
The support for this orientation comes from a substantial portion 
of the official-managerial sub-class. Their influence is increased 
because they do hold key knowledge needed to operate state and 
economy, and because they have close links with and - on specific 
issues at least - over backing by the bulk of the aid agency/ 
technical assistance community. This is not surprising, as the 
technocratic world-view is authoritarian and global.
In respect to this orientation’s membership, particular identifi­
cation problems arise because up to a point efficiency, discipline 
and incentives are main-line priorities. Therefore, the gradation 
from a basically main-line orientation to this one is gradual with 
no clear break except in praxis on concrete issues or crises.
Further, to date at least, this orientation has not been self- 
conscious in the sense of coherent opposition to main-line goals 
on a consistent basis as opposed to criticism of specific policies 
and individual efforts - within the Party and State - to alter the 
balance of priorities.
The right authoritarian position used to centre on the neo-kulak 
fraction of large peasants and associated officials, managers and 
politicians. The 1965 election, the 1967 Arusha Declaration and 
the series of measures to reduce the power of the old line co­
operatives and the traditional agricultural technocrats as well as 
selctive expulsions from the Party and - in one or two regions - 
land redistribution under villageisation, have reduced the potential
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of neo-kulakism organising a counter sub-class alliance against 
the main line.
The present right authoritarian orientation is not coherently 
organised except in one or two regions. It includes some officials 
and managers, the remnants of the neo-kulak sub-classes and some 
private sector economic activists. While it can cite foreign 
ideological statements as compatible with "its" goals more than with 
the main lines, its foreign support in terms of close contacts or 
backing on specific issues, is minimal. The last group battle of 
this orientation was against the 1973 Income Tax Act (as a symbol 
of egalitarianism). Initially a majority of M P 1s (though not 
necessarily of elected mainland MP's) backed them, but recoiled 
in total rout in the face of a Presidential-Party statement that 
a general election on the egalitarianism issue would follow defeat 
of the b i l l . ^
This orientation is overtly anti-egalitarian (in respect to income, 
services, participation) not merely seeking restoration of 1960's 
real salary levels. It is also basically anti-Party and State 
because it sees them as worker and peasant dominated and democratic 
which it sees as demogogic. Its desire to unleash the private 
sector and put peasants and workers "in their place" is overtly 
anti-socialist as well as authoritarian.
In addition to these three strands, there are populist counter- 
ideological fragments. These are not coherent in sub-class base or 
objective nature of goals, nor are they stable over time. Their 
influence has been in affecting Party policy sequences (eg sumptuary 
legislation limiting ownership and use of private cars)' or in being 
used by particular Party leaders to create a momentum for their
personal priorities (eg nationalisation of large-scale landlords).
At a more micro-level worker/manager conflict outside Party/State 
channels has often been populist - genuine or manupulated by 
managerial fractions. Finally, there have been gestures like the 
1982 aeroplane hijacking, which are best characterised as febrile, 
lumpen proletariat populism.
Part of the difficulty in identifying these orientations is that 
each has certain goals and priorities which, in part, overlap those 
of fractions of main-line adherents. Thus the position of in­
dividuals and groups is not easy to fix and, indeed, shifts from 
issue to issue. Further, while CCM is not an open membership party 
it is a broad membership one, so that holding a set of views more 
consistent with one of these orientations than main-line Ujamaa has, 
in the past - and to a somewhat lesser extent today - not necessarily 
been incompatible with continued Party membership and holding sig­
nificant statal or parastal leadership position.
Toward Democratic Choice and Review-Elections
Tanzania is characterised by widespread use of competitive elections 
for Party, state and workplace bodies. These are often very hotly 
contested with over 100 candidates in the primary round for some 
National Assembly seats in 1980.
In general the use of elections is increasing. With the completion 
of restructuring the elected element in Regional, District and 
Ward Development Committees and restoring local councils, there 
will be complete tiers of elected bodies from village to national 
level in both state and Party.
There are limitations on the electoral process - some overtly 
designed to increase freedom of choice (whatever the result) and
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some designed to eliminate candidates commmitted to racism,
20religious intolerance, capitalism or authoritarianism. Candidates 
(for state as well as Party posts with the de facto exception of 
village committees) must be Party members which means that they 
must be workers or peasants, at least formally committed to tran­
sition to socialism and not significantly involved in private 
enterprise. After primary selection processes (limited to Party 
members - again de facto except for villages), candidates are 
subject to central Party review. The number of rejections is 
usually very small - there have been higher proportions at regional 
or district party level in cases in which pro-capitalist coalitions 
were strong in particular areas.^
Election campaigns are held for limited time periods, with strict 
limits on campaigning (usually only at meetings held by the Party 
at which both candidates speak) ana a ban on significant expenditure 
(especially "treating" votes). In state institution elections all 
registered citizens of 18 and above are eligible to vote not only 
Party members.
The Presidential election is somewhat different. The Party selects 
a single nominee who is de_ facto subject to a yea/nay referendum.
A 'nay1 majority would lead to a second referendum with a different 
single candidate. There is a not insignificant body of thinking in 
the Party in favour of shifting to a two candidate system in 1985 
(when President Nyerere will not be running for re-election).
For most state bodies there are a substantial minority of appointed 
members añd indirectly elected ones. The forms of indirect election 
vary - usually with nomination by a group (eg co-operatives, trade 
union, women's league, youth league, university) and election by the
other members of the body in question. Party bodies also have 
substantial proportions of ex-officio members and at National 
Executive and Central Committee levels, the elected majority is 
elected by the National Congress (ie, indirectly elected).
Workplace elected bodies are dominant only in villages. In places 
of employment Workers Councils (and Committees) as well as JUWATA 
(trade union) and Party branches committees are directly elected. 
However, they are participatory, advisory, dialogue and confron­
tational rather than executive and managerial bodies.
The results of elections suggest substantial elements of initial 
choice and review exist. Turnover is high - normally over 50% for 
the National Assembly - and uncontested elections are relatively 
rare (less so at the lowest Party levels). Voter turnout is 
relatively high - on the order of 30% of registered voters and 65% 
of those potentially eligible in National Assembly/Presidential 
elections. Petitions can be and are filed,and do on occasion 
(in each National Assembly election) result in orders (by the 
Courts in National Assembly cases) for re-election on the basis 
of violation of electoral process rules.
Party Supremacy: Nature and Structure
Tanzania has been a de facto one party state since 1961 (TANU never 
had a significant opposition) and a de jure one since 1962. As 
noted above, Party membership is a pre-condition for state as well 
as Party elective office, but both primary (Party) and final (adult 
citizens for state electoral offices) elections are competitive.
The Party is supreme, ie the National Congress of the Party is the 
ultimate policy deciding body and between its sessions ultimate
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decision-taking power vests in the National Executive Committee,
Central Committee and/or Party Chairman. The National Assembly
is the law-making body but does not have authority to decline to
act on or to act aginst basic Party policy or decisions - an issue
22tested in several clashs, all lost by the Assembly. While the Part
Party is financed by a State budget transfer and the Ministry of
Finance can debate the amount, action to restrict the Party by
23financial cuts is not a conceivable line of action.
CCM (TANU plus Afro-Shirazi) is a mass party with in the order of 
2.5 million members, or 30% of adult citizens. It has rejected 
the frequently presented case to become a vanguard party on three 
grounds: fear of creating a new authoritarian elite (many vanguard 
advocats clearly were authoritarian in outlook, "quis custodiet 
custodies?" and belief that mass mobilisation and consciousness- 
raising required a mass party.
On the other hand, CCM is not an open membership party - broad 
church it is, but innocent of creeds and definitions of heresy 
it is not. Only workers and peasants are eligible to become or 
remain members. Leaders and their immediate families^cannot have 
significant private business involvement - a rule with teeth, albeit 
not very tightly enforced in respect to farmers with small permanent 
labour forces, small family businesses with only casual employees 
and either one large or several small rented houses. There is not 
a capitalist fraction of significance in CCM nationally, nor in 
more than two or three mainland regions. There are managerial/ 
bureaucratic proto-fractions but not organised as such, and very 
rarely dominant. Whether workers and peasants are dominant is less 
clear - most leaders came from workerEpeasant families, clearly 
feel responsible to them, could be elected "out" by them, but have
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education, income and household consumption patterns atypical of 
workers and peasants as classes.
Ideological consciousness in CCM is very uneven - at all levels, 
not just at the base. Party ideological college, teacher and 
member education courses have sought to combat this as have major 
Party and leader documents and speeches, Except for those by the 
President, the latter often err either toward being too intellectual 
(or technical) with too few objective correllatives readily grasped 
by the man in the street. The political education work has - at its 
mass teacher training and member levels - often been noticeably 
more rhetorical and jargonistic and shorter on Tanzanian context 
and actual strategy-policy-tactics than Party internal dialogue 
and praxis.
The Parry's interpretation of supremacy aces not include detailed 
policy formulation nor implentation. These are seen as state res­
ponsibilities. Monitoring, review and corrective action (including 
investigations and firings) are seen as parllel state/Party respon­
sibilities. The Party, therefore, does not have a large technical 
secretariat. The reasons are threefold: if the state is to do 
detailed articulation and implementation it must have technical 
staff and there are not enough in Tanzania to staff two parallel 
structures; a highpowered Party technocracy might divert attention 
from overall policy-strategy-review; state and Party technocrats 
might unite to influence the Party and reduce its ability to view 
and control managers and bureaucrats.
At sub-national levels the operational meaning of Party supremacy 
is unclear. It clearly does not mean cell or branch or constituency 
or regional Party direct action to block or reverse village,
decentralised government or parastatal decisions/actions. It clearly 
does comprise direct representations to the bodies taking such 
actions, and, in the case no agreed resolution results, upward 
reference within the Party. However, very considerable practical 
confusion and tensions exist with occasional Party intervention 
inconsistent with this reading and with more frequent refusal by 
statal and parastatal bodies to take Party representations
i  2 4seriously.
The Party's organisational structure is based on 10 House (family) 
cells. There are then sub-branches and branches which are either 
residentally (eg villages, wards) or workplace (eg factories, 
service establishments, ministries) based. Beyond these are con­
stituency (district), regional and national units. Beyond the 
National Congress - and chosen by it, are the National Executive 
Committee, Central Committee and Chairman. (The Chairman of the 
Party and the President of the United Republic need not be the 
same person. Indeed, as the two terms overlap, the first two years 
of a new President's term are likely to be paralleled by the last 
two of his Presidential predecessor's term as Chairman). The NEC 
meets frequently, while the Central Committee is basically full­
time with specialist committees to oversee policy formulation and 
performance in particular sectors (eg public enterprises).
Party-state overlap is relatively low in the state to Party 
direction. Few Ministers and senior officials are NEC or CC members. 
In the Party to state direction Regional Commissioners are Party 
Regional Secretaries and Regional executive heads, plus members of 
parliament and Party nominees do sit as such on a number of para­
statal boards. At village level the separation of state and Party 
is somewhat artificial - its formal structural reality is unlikely
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to be perceived as very meaningful by most villages.
Party performance in communication, mobilisation and control is
distinctly uneven although substantially greater than most outside
25observers have seen it as being. Perhaps surprisingly, communi­
cation up from base units (ie, the more active ones) to regional 
and national level is more generally effective than that downward 
to explain Party decisions and apply them to concrete local realities. 
National leader speeches can substitute for a more effective Party 
structure on explanation but not on local application. Mobilisation 
has been successful at three levels - nationally organised support 
for basic national policies, certain national campaigns articulated 
to local level (notably in respect to environmental sanitation and 
literacy) and village (and occasional urban ward)self-help action 
so long as the choices of action urged included some village 
priorities.
A related function at 10 House Cell and Ward levels is reconciliation 
and arbitration of disputes (subject to taking the case to court). 
Policy formulation has been uneven, especially in checking whether 
statal/parastal articulation actually implemented the basic 
decision, was at a tangent to it or - in some cases - clearly mis­
interpreted (accidentally or on purpose). There has been a tighten­
ing up since 197 9 in this area as well as in review - investigation- 
- corrective action decision-taking (largely by the Central Committee) 
but results remain problematic. Discipline of Party leaders is, on 
the whole, effective, that of statal and parastatal leaders is so 
far from complete in coverage (or coherent in process) as to appear 
arbitrary, and may do more to cause avoiding taking any decisions 
rather than to "encourager les autres" to reform their probity or 
efficiency.
-  23 -
Statal and Parastatal Structures
The legislative and executive/operational side of the state are 
articulated at five levels (national, regional, district, ward and 
village) both for statal and for parastatal bodies (albeit in prac­
tice the latter - except for wholesale trade - are dominantly 
national). The two middle levels - district and ward - are the 
weakest.
The National Assembly is formally primarily a legislation debating 
and passing body, but in practice this is not a function it performs 
very deeply, as it has limited capacity to debate in detail (despite 
specialist committees) and de_ facto none to amend and redraft. It 
can, and does, force reconsideration of bills, but relatively rarely. 
It is an effective questioning and performance review body (especially 
via member questions and the Public and Parastatal Accounts 
Committees). As a National Planning Commission (divided into specia­
list committees with co-opted members) it has a significant - albeit 
unevenly used - role in policy articulation (except in response to 
crises where the technocrat-Minister-Cabinet-President-CC or NEC 
route effectively bypasses it). M P 1s are members of Party and 
state bodies at district and regional level, and are in a position 
to act as two-way communication agents (including respresenting 
local needs and criticisms) but only a minority appear to play 
this role effectively.
At regional, district and ward level there are Development Councils 
(or Committees) with non-official majorities. These are influential 
although the weight of the public versus official members varies 
widely. Urban district councils have been re-established and rural 
ones will be, regularising (and allowing renewal of) the elected 
members of the district and ward development bodies. The legislative
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powers of the councils are relatively limited - greater in the 
urban case where separate budgets of some substance and not insig­
nificant district revenues exist. Village assemblies (all adult 
members) are presumably the legislative body at that level, albeit 
in practice the Village Council normally carries out most policy­
making, as well as executive/operational functions.
The executive/operational side of the state is headed by an 
Executive President with a Cabinet of Ministers (appointed by him 
but a genuinely policy deliberative body). The operational side 
of government is headed by a Presidentially appointed Prime Minister. 
In practice the President, Prime Minister, and Ministers are res­
ponsible more to the Party than to the National Assembly, albeit 
the latter can, and has, been severe and effective in criticism of 
certain parastatals, ministries and ministers.
The Ministers head functional ministries which are responsible for 
government operations. De_ facto Regional Commissioners head an 
additional 21 regional, multi-function ministries. While the latter 
are co-ordinated by the Prime Minister's office and liaise with 
central ministries, they are basically at parity with central minis­
tries (except PM's, Finance, and Planning) in terms of power, in­
fluence and relative autonomy. District and Ward operational units 
are subsiduaries either of Regional or National Ministries as are 
central government personnel in villages. However, Village Councils 
and their committees have substantial operational programmes - par­
ticularly in communal investment and in certain parastatal-type 
marketing and trading functions - which are basically independent 
and largely self-financed.
Parastatal operations (which dominate large and medium-scale directi'
productive activity) are carried out by separate enterprises. Most 
are responsible to functional ministries (eg financial institutions 
to Finance) for purposes of broad policy formulation, annual budget­
ing review and performance monitoring. In practice their degree 
(and use) of autonomy varies widely. Wholesale parastatals are 
jointly responsible to Regions and to Finance with a technical 
monitoring body in the Board of Internal Trade). There are a few 
regional parastatals and a substantial number of (largely unsuccess­
ful) district ones.
Decentralisation, Access, Competence, Leadership 
Basic government operations except Finance, Planning, Security, 
Justice, post-primary education and most health services are 
decentralised to Regions. Regions are not self-financing - partly 
because varigated local tax structures would make a nonsense of 
national economic policy and partly because providing increasingly 
uniform levels of basic services to regions with very unequal levels 
of productive forces per capita, and of geographic factors affecting 
units costs would in any event entail very large central government 
transfers. That this in practice limits their autonomy in programme 
formulation more than that of central ministries is by no means 
evident.
Decentralisation is seen as technically efficient because it allows 
decisions on small local projects/programmes and in the local data 
/requirement context in a way not realistically attainable in a 
Dar es Salaam centred system. It is also seen as pro-participatory 
because workers and peasants can reach officials responsible for 
decisions directly affecting them - which they could not, were such 
decisions taken in Dar es Salaam. Limited data and personnel 
and a fairly standard bureaucratic desire to limit participation 
do restrain - but not eliminate - gains on these counts since
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decentralisation in 1972.
Both decentralisation to regions and functional allocations to par­
ticular ministries and parastatals require effective inter- 
institutional co-ordination to avoid inconsistencies. Such 
co-ordination varies from quite good - eg Water, Forestry, Education, 
Health with Regions, Finance with financial.parastatals, the indus­
trial and investment promotion committee to astoundingly bad, eg 
Agriculture with regions and with its parastatals, Water and Power 
with urban water and power users - statal or parastatal.
Access and participation vary even more widely by Ministry, Region 
and parastatal. In practice parastatal access to the general public 
(as opposed to workesr or institutions represented on boards) is 
generally poor. Even those - such as the Coffee Authority - which 
are highly responsive to grower needs and effecgive at meeting them 
have little formal access and no formal participation (and as a direct 
result, horrible image and public relations problems with growers).
Ministries are unequally responsive. Positively, the Treasury has 
acted repeatedly to protect taxpayers from attempts to nullify 
tax reductions (or in one case collect a tax twice), Lands and Urban 
Development has in fact recognised squatters rights, sought to 
regularise their position (and other Ministries and authorities 
have moved to provide water, health and education to them). 
Negatively, Lands has not worked out a useable surveying/planning 
system for "informal"sector-built, low-income housing areas and 
Agriculture (nationally and regionally) has not realised that its 
imposition of outside Village Managers is neither technically 
efficient (they are isolated and largely unable to act) and contrary 
to any village-based development process.
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All statal and parastatal institutions tend to be relatively 
hierarchical and closed. In practice a majority of their personnel 
have a class bias against taking workers and peasants seriously, or 
altering policy at their instance.
2 6Competence of statal and parastatal bodies varies enormously.
Both sectors are objectively overextended. Whether more limited 
functions would be a general solution is less clear, as the private 
sector has even more limited competence. In almost all cases there 
is a substantial capacity to act - few institutions exist only on 
paper and in offices with no operational activity. A number have 
very substantial results to their credit. Parastatal operating 
profits at gross level exceed 5% of GDP and not of losses of other 
parastatals, probably 3%. (This suggests the diversity of competence 
in the sector, albeit it understates it, as the worst loss-makers 
tend to be bad at producing their intended goods or services.)
The present economic crisis has clearly affected competence (in 
terms of performance) negatively.
Managerial/bureaucratic personnel are,in terms of Tanzanian income
distribution, basically middle-class. Operationally they are
collectively powerful. They have not, however, been able to prevent
substantial erosion of their real incomes absolutely and relative
to minimum wage earnesr and peasants (a result partly mitigated by
27somewhat oddly formulated fringe benefit incomes). Equally, both 
the Party and workers/peasants have eroded their power to take 
decisions without direct accountability. Prior to retirement they 
are not able (in principle or to any substantial extent in practice) 
to have private business interests or to draw salaries for more 
than one public sector job. While some became businessmen (or in­
fluence peddlers) on retirement, most in practice have no such
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opportunity whatever their inclination. Therefore/ to see them as 
a.dominant class appears somewhat eccentric.
Security and Coercion
The quantity of force available to the Tanzanian state and Party 
is quite inadequate to operate systematic coercion (as opposed 
to specific cases) except coercion with broad popular backing 
(eg nationalisation, progressive taxation). This is a factor 
reinforcing the main line Ujamaa ideology against generalised 
coercion and especially against generalised authoritarianism.
Police number less than one per thousand population. The Home 
Affairs budget has risen less rapidly than public expenditure 
generally.
The police are under civilian control, political and 
administrative. Abuses of authority - including illegal 
detention and torture have happened. The most notorious case 
of the former led to a major press campaign and a number of 
firings (as well as releases), the worst case of the latter to 
resignation of the Minister and Head of Police (as responsible 
though unaware) and to prosecution and conviction of senior 
police officers for murder. While the response does not excuse 
the offenses it does indicate that it is not policy and that 
action against such abuse is possible.
In general the police are civil rather than violent in the 
performance of their duties - the exceptions relate to suspects 
they believe to be guilty. Crimes of violence and robberies of 
poor people are the offences which most arouse the force (not 
burglaries of upper income households). In general worker and
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peasant criticisms of police relate to inadequate numbers and 
toughness not to oppression or class bias.
Tanzania's prison service is basically rehabilitation through 
work (farming and industrial crafts) oriented - probably with 
some success in respect to economic context motivated offenders 
and persons convicted of minor crimes of violence. Because 
Tanzania is a poor country - not because of any state view of 
bad conditions as punishment - food and accommodation are 
austere.
Since 1965 Tanzania has had threatened or actual incursions 
or calls for solidarity from a neighbour in every year. Self 
defence clearly does explain the rise in military forces to 
over 60,000 at the peak of the response to the Ugandan invasion. 
Portugal, Zairois factions, Burundi, Malawi, Uganda,Rhodesia, 
and South Africa have featured as threatened and/or actual 
invaders. The largest military operation was the turning 
back of the 1978 Amin invasion and subsequent support for 
Ugandan liberation followed by provision of security forces 
to the four successive civil governments to mid-1981. The 
second and third have been provision of assistance to 
Mozambique for self defense against Rhodesian and South 
African/South African puppet incursions (the last a continuing 
operation).
The armed forces have never been used domestically. (The 
militia - a rather uneven homeguard - have sometimes been used 
as police auxiliaries but as a fairly random cross section of 
lower income workers and peasants whose formal involvement
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is very low can hardly be seen as armed forces or even as 
a true security force distinct from civil society.) They are 
under civil government and Party (in respect to political 
education and ideology) control. The serious military coup 
attempt (Kambona 1967) cam unstuck because the officers 
canvassed immediately reported the canvasses. The military 
services do not appear to be or aspire to be a separate 
military force though they clearly are consciously nationalist 
and proud of their record of professional success.
Laws, Laws, The Judiciary and Detention
Tanzania - both formally and in terms of the beliefs of 
a majority of its leaders - is committed to the rule of 
law. The passage of the 1975 village government act to 
regularize internal village organisation and powers (including 
those in relation to land), nationalisation and compensation 
statutes and the powers (and exercise thereof) of the Controller 
and Auditor General all underline this.
However, there are distinct vagaries. Many officials do not 
know or understand laws governing their conduct. The concept 
of administrative law as a tool of the state which must be 
obeyed while in force but subject to amendment (not casual 
violation) when it impedes implementation of policy is not widely 
grasped with much clarity.
In general major decisions directly affecting individuals are 
justiciable. In some cases the venue are specialist tribunals 
but most of these do provide for appeal to the High Court.
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The exceptions to justiciability are basically political 
economic judgement decisions for which the appeal is seen 
as to the Party on policy and the Party or the ombudsman 
(Permanent Commission of Inquiry) on equity or propriety.
In practice justiciability is little used - appears are usually 
to more senior state officials, the Party or the ombudsman.
Independence of the judiciary is practically as well as
formally entrenched. In certain major political cases
(e.g. the treason trial) court acquittals have been allowed
to stand and judges have not been removed. In a case in
2 8a sense apparently involving a state policy commitment a
senior judge privately inquired of a senior politician
29whether he should overrule the assessors and convict. He
was told it would be as totally improper to answer his
question as it was of him to have asked it and if he repeated
30such an approach he would be sacked. Certainly the courts
have on occasion emasculated themselves by refusing to act on 
cases in which law and policy seemed in conflict but this has 
not, in at least the main cases, been from state or Party 
pressure. Indeed its main result was to delay the recognition 
of need to amend laws to correspond to basic policy decisions; 
a realisation which would have come sooner had the initial 
cases been adjudicated.
Tanzania has detention legislation. It is on occasions 
abused at both national and local levels. Abuses are at 
least sometimes publicized, corrected and action taken 
against the abuser of authority.
Detention nationally has been used to defend state security
against what were perceived as real dangers but ones in which
proof beyond reasonable doubt (as opposed to evidence up to
reasonable certainty of a clear and present danger)was not
to hand. These have included a handful of sedition/treason 
31cases, at least one purportedly populist agitator (to 
murder of suspect cattle thieves) and a rather larger number 
of exchange control and economic corruption cases perceived
32as economic sabotage threatening national economic security.
The numbers actually in detention (excluding awaiting formulation
of charges which will in fact follow) have apparently been as
high as 1,000 - largely exchange control- but have usually been
33under 100 and often (as at early 1982) either under 100 or nil.
Detention without trial is undesirable because always open to
abuse. Tanzanians are aware of this danger. To date use of
detention has been relatively rare, relatively brief and - with
the possible exception of the exchange control cases - not a
34handy substitute for trials.
The greatest dangers to the rule of law appear to be techno­
cratic weaknesses. Prosecutions are often inept, many of the 
magistracy do not seem to have a very good comprehension of the 
law, the seriousness (in social and rational terms) of 
certain economic offenses (e.g. exchange control violations
resulting in substantial foreign exchange loss) is not
35comprehended by the courts, the police are understaffed 
qualtitatively and particularly in respect to specialist 
personnel. Weaknesses in arrest and conviction rates,
acquittals (however proper) on technical grounds and trivial 
sentences for crimes having major national economic consequences 
do erode, faith in the legal process.
Freedom of Speech, Fear, Access to Communication 
Formally Tanzanians have freedom of speech. In practice 
many exercise it both within and outside Party/state forums. 
While most criticism is supportive, a substantial amount calls 
for substantial and some for systemic change. Prosecution or 
detention for criticism is unknown and victimisation in other 
ways, while not unknown, not particularly common.
That said, there is a widespread concern that respect for 
authority.can become fear to criticize, fear to make criticism 
(especially of misconduct) detailed enough to act on and - 
especially - fear to make proposals as to ways, means and 
new policies lest these be misconstrued as hostile criticism. 
Building up civil criticism and intellectual initiative (rather 
than suppressing it) has been of substantial concern to the 
President and a significant number of other Party and 
state leaders with some success over time.
How much fear there is is hard to evaluate. Some surely.
But when criticisms so serious and so detailed as to justify 
wholesale restructuring of senior regional personnel can 
be and are made to the President at an open meeting (and 
are acted upon - Mwanza 1980/81) then one is not in anything 
resembling a basically repressive state. Similarly when 
police investigating complaints about street venders refusing 
to pay licenses after their abolition read the newspapers
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waved by vendors, ring the Treasury to check and tell the 
city would be collectors to be gone or arrested for harrass- 
ment,neither fear of petty administrative power (nor a basis 
for such fear) in its classic form exists. However, as the 
cases submitted to and reported on (often with particular 
or more general results) by the ombudsman show,there are reasons 
for fear but also a belief that improper actions should be 
challenged and can be to some purpose. Letters to the editor
in the press (which is basically Party and parastatal) are
on balance frank and critical - sometimes hostilely so.
The trend appears to be toward more, more detailed and more 
searching criticism. Clearly the problems of the present 
crisis create reasons for such a trend but that it is evident
suggests that they have not given rise (as they might well
have) to greater authoritarian suppression of criticism.
The radio is state operated. It is not particularly critical 
and except for major speeches or national campaigns perhaps 
not very analytical or educational in any direction despite some 
improvement over the past few years. The main press (two 
parastatal papers, one a Party institution) is another matter.
It is frequently critical, reasonably and increasingly (if unevenly) 
analytical and does publish letters to the editor and "guest 
features" which are often critical of major policies as well 
as of improprieties and botches and are sometimes basically 
in contradiction (to left or right) with main line Ujamaa 
ideology. There are indeed limits to the freedom of these 
papers - the proprietors do sometimes write leaders, in 1971
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the (then largely expatriate) editors of the Daily News were 
changed when it openly backed a communist military coup in 
the Sudan against known government policy (in military camps 
in general as well as that instance) - but they are probably 
less restrictive than those imposed by most proprietors.
There are some independent,weekly or monthly, church papers 
(one Lengo very much in the business of social analysis and 
criticism and the sister to a paper subject to severe 
pressures from time to time in Kenya) which do have claims 
to critical and analytical independence. The one or two 
private commercially oriented weeklies avoid any socio 
political or political economic substance and are hardly 
significant communication media.
Publishing in Tanzania includes independent magazines 
(basically critical main line and left critic mixes) and 
both parastatal and private commercial book publishers 
(related to more general printing business). Left (by the 
parastatal publisher) and right (by a church press) critics 
volumes have been printed (and reviewed, not necessarily 
hostilely, in the parastatal newspapers). Given the limited 
foreign exchange newsprint and ink import licenses could 
easily be - but have not been - used to control all 
publications.
The foreign press corps is exiguous and not very professional. 
It has on occasion been sharply criticized but deportations 
or visa denials are rare and usually related to causes broader 
than criticism per se. Foreign newspapers, magazines and books
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are not very widely available not because of censorship but 
because of foreign exchange limitations. The partial 
exceptions are Africa, Africa Now, New African, Newsweek and 
Time. Foreign radio broadcasts are not jammed. A selection
of foreign press reports - somewhat oddly usually highly
16critical ones - are printed in the parastatal newspapers 
under the heading "What they say about us".
Relations of Party, statal and parastal bodies to the press
and to researchers are marked by a mixture of desire to inform
(based on a belief they can often take pride in what they have
achieved and a parallel belief that outside observation and
analysis can provide useful insights), a fear of being
misinterpreted, a conviction that knowledge is power and
should be reviewed before release, a shortage of time (compounded
by the arrogant time demands of many researchers and pressman)
and an old tradition (colonial but also global bureaucratic)
of secretism. in practice release of information and access
for research is very uneven, sometimes amazingly open and biased
in favour of known persons (citizen or foreigner) whose past
performance leads to a belief there will be a fair (not
necessarily favourable) assessment and a return flow of
37useful comment and analysis. On balance the record is 
improving, better than in the USSR, probably better than in 
the UK but distinctly poorer than in Scandinavia or the USA.
Voluntary Organisations: Scope and Limitations
It would be a mistake to see Tanzanian civil society and
social organisation as consisting solely of Party and state
units or adjuncts. The network of organisations to which
individuals, families and members of sub-classes belong is
3 8substantially more' complex and dense.
One group does consist of Party affiliates and sections - 
youth, women, parents, wage workers, elders. At one level 
these are part of the Party structure but in terms of local, 
and even in some cases national level activity they have 
substantial autonomy and initiative. This is especially 
true of women and parents. UWT (the women's organisation) 
serves as an umbrella for a wide array of basically indep­
endent local women's groups related to particular economic 
and social level and/or liberation issues. TAPA (the parent's 
organisation) has turned into a pressure group for middle 
income parents seeking to protect/expand private secondary 
schools to buy their children an extra chance if they fail 
to pass state system entry exams. Arguably - some CCM leaders 
have indeed argued it and TAPA was almost dropped as an 
affiliated organisation in 1977 - this is a sub-class position 
quite inconsistent with the main line Ujamaa ideology.
Somewhat analagous are the Workeis Councils as foci for employ­
ment unit level worker organisation (often, outside the formal 
trade union - JUWATA - branch). Such organisation ranges from 
non-existent to significant and in the latter case often goes
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beyond employment conditions, and receiving respect for workers 
as human beings to direct economic (eg co-op shop, savings and 
credit society) and mutual assistance activity.
The largest voluntary organisations in the Western sense are 
religious - Islamic and Christian with a combined fairly 
regularly practicing membership of perhaps 5 million and a 
much larger less active one. The membership of the former is 
larger but the latter are much more organised and socially 
active. While direct basic social service function provision 
is largely state, there is still a significant religious 
institution involvement in health and teacher training as well 
as less broadly based services including counselling (pera- 
psychiatric) and urban residences for unmarried women. Church 
involvement in rural development has been uneven but quite 
substantial at grassroots level in certain views both in the 
past and today. There is no very coherent Christian or 
Islamic socio or politic economic/applied theological position. 
While there are liberation theologians,the institutional 
churches are relatively conservative but not usually to the 
extent of being identifiably part of any counter ideological 
position or even of being very coherent or frequent critics of 
state and Party. On balance state relations with church and 
mosque as social institutions are friendly,albeit not particul­
arly close.
Urban co-operatives have several thousand members (beyond those 
in co-op shops which are adjuncts of employment unit worker 
organisations and women in specifically women's production or
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trading co-ops). They are in retail trade, small industry 
or crafts and transport with quite uneven levels of success
- a number have demonstrated substantial capacity to survive
39and to continue to carry out economic functions.
Other Western type organisations include sports clubs, YMCA's 
and YWCA’s, a family planning association, Rotary and Round 
Table, Red Cross, St. John’s Ambulance Society, and a variety 
of local social service bodies. The sports clubs-entered on 
football - have by far the largest membership and some of 
them are the only basically working class organisations in 
this group. The Y's and family planning association are 
fairly strong but basically middle class. The Rotary and 
Roundtable by their nature are noblesse oblige manager/owner 
groups and as such have a real impact. The others are fairly 
weak in membership and programme with a handful of local, 
specific issue exceptions.
Modified African "traditional” civil society bodies have not
40been studied very systematically. While traditional
community ("tribal” and clan) organisations are, in general, 
not strong in Tanzania a number of other groups - eg age groups
- are and have significant roles within certain "modern" instit­
utions including villages, rural militia units and Party units 
up to branch level.
All voluntary organisations require registration to operate in 
Tanzania and must file annual reports on operations. This
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requirement is not operated particularly restrictively albeit 
some of the refusals to register - usually on the basis of 
concealed social divisiveness or anti-U.jamaa orientation - 
are less than easy to understand on their face. The standard 
African ban on Jehovah's Witnesses and its direct action wing, 
the Watchtower Movement, applies in Tanzania. Bodies which - 
as the Witnesses/Watchtower do - specifically deny the legitim­
acy of the state (and Party) fall outside the limits of 
tolerance and democratic choice as they are interpreted in 
Tanzania. The same holds true of bodies which set themselves 
up as advocates and operators of alternative socio-economic
policies especially if they are substantially foreign led or
41funded - eg the Ruvuma Development Association.
The larger voluntary organisations (and those like Rotary/Round­
table providing specific social service complements to the state 
sector) are perceived by the state and Party as legitimate 
and significant parts of civil society. They receive funding
for particular programmes. The Tanzanian Community Development
\Trust has been reorganised as a quasi official liaison body 
to bring together foreign and local (especially village) 
voluntary associations in programme cooperation.
Sub Class Struggle: Notes On Problematic Complexity
The main line Ujamaa ideology, as noted, quite overtly recognises
the existence of class struggle and the need for action based
on class interests. It is equally clear in situating CCM as
a party of workers and peasants at least in membership base
and aspiration.
However, the tone of CCM (and its predecessor TANU) on sub­
class struggle has usually been in terms of non or semi 
antagonistic contradictions to be resolved by a series of 
state actions no one of which could be described as revolution­
ary and which would not, in practice, cause heightened inter-sub 
class antoganism. Even in respect to more revolutionary measures 
- eg nationalisations, leadership code, Mwongozo on participat­
ion - the level of rhet rical candemnation has been relatively 
muted, and the "who is not against us is with us" approach 
has been used to maximise acceptance and minimise the potential 
allies for actual or would be active opponents.
There are a number of reasons behind this approach^:
1. Tanzania took over state power in working order, peace­
fully but also without the breadth and intensity of 
national consciousness a longer and more bitter independ­
ence struggle might have forged;
2. Tanzanian consciousness of exploitation was largely in 
terms of foreign domination not domestic sub-classes 
and at the latter level was at independence dangerously
open to deteriorating into racism against the Asian
. . 42minority;
3. The human, ideological, consciousness institutional 
and financial resources of Tanzania (and until 1977 
perhaps especially those under firm Party/state control) 
were (and remain) limited and fragile - thus repeated 
violent contradictions could shatter rather than speed 
up development and transition to socialism;
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4. Objectively the main enemy is seen as imperialism in the sense 
of a great power dominated global political economic and geo­
political system, and in particular, the white Southern African 
sub-system (now reduced to South Africa and its occupied 
territory of Namibia, but in 1961 comprising all territories 
south of Tanganyika, as it then was). Therefore, the cost of 
domestic class struggles to national solidarity against im­
perialism was perceived as substantial, especially if the
43struggles became bitterly and openly antagonistic;
5. The relative ease of the transition to independence meant not 
just that there was no clear "anti-national" sub-class coalition 
which had stood with the colonialists (as there clearly was in
- say - Mozambique) but also no coherent sub-class coalition 
ranged against TANU, a context in which heightening contra­
dictions might solidify opposition, and force it to organise 
more effectively than a less high-key and more gradual approach;
6. Many - probably most - Tazanians share President Nyerere!s 
belief that civility and reasoned discourse are valuable 
because of the nature of the human relations they make possible. 
"Argue, don't shout" as the President titled a foreign policy 
memorandum to leaders, has been a working maxim of TANU/CCM 
and of state organs.
This is very far from saying that class struggle has not taken place 
or that the Party/state have not been directly - and usually con­
spicuously-involved, sometimes in problematic or ambiguous ways.
It is perhaps easiest to cite instances in respect to particular 
sub-classes: Neo-kulaks, Peasants, Wage Earners, Bureaucratic- 
Managerial Elite, Capitalist/Rentiers, Intellectuals and Women.
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Neo-kulaks - The Main Perceived Domestic Challenge 
The alliance of neo-kulaks (large peasants amassing good land and 
employing labour) with officials (particularly local, but more 
generally within the Ministry of Agriculture) and co-op managers 
was at independence potentially a real challenge to more worker/ 
peasant orientation dominance within TANU. Senior politicians up 
to Cabinet level were - at least then - associated with it, while 
the co-op structure including two major financial institutions was 
the largest African controlled economic institution in Tanzania.
Clashes between these two orientations were fairly frequent at local 
and regional Party level - especially in Kagera (then West Lake), 
Mwanza, Shinyanga, Arusha, Kilimamjaro and Iringa Regions. The 1965 
elections weakened the neo-kulak strength in the Assembly (although 
it remained of some significance at least until the 1968 expulsions 
of a group of M P 's associated with or seeking to build a base on it).
The action to reduce the neo-kulak power base was step by step.
Co-op movemenet inquiries led to re-organisations and suspensions 
designed to remove entrenched neo-kulak leadership and strengthen 
small peasant influence. In 1971 the Co-op Bank and Rural Develop­
ment Credit Agency were taken from the Co-ops, and the first merged 
into the National Bank of Commerce and the latter reformed as the 
Rural Development Bank (both responsible to Finance, not Agriculture). 
In 1976 co-ops beyond primary level were abolished. Their planned 
recreation at district and regional level, given the new village 
primary society base and the general weakening of neo-kulak influence, 
may have quite different sub-class implications than was previously 
the case.
Land reallocation in Ujamaa (1967-73) and Development (1974-76)
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villages reduced the neo-kulak share of good land. Villageisation 
reduced their influence over other peasants and the degree to which 
state services were concentrated on them. The creation of a 
Rural Development Division in the Prime Minister's Office provided 
a counter to the believed pro-kulak bias of most agricultural 
offices. All these changes were relative - larger peasants still 
have more land (albeit land distribution in Tanzania is very equal 
- excluding parastatal units and a handful of plantations - by world 
or even African standards), hold a disproportionate share of village 
level posts, and receive more attention from extension officers 
than their numbers warrant. The impact has been uneven - in some 
villages and districts neo-kulak influence remains strong, and - 
especially in the Arusha-Moshi area a number of neo-kulaks are 
individually prosperous and organised to protect their interests 
as a local sub-class. But overall, it has been weakened absolutely, 
is no longer advancing and can hardly be seen as a potential 
focus for a counter coalition inside or outside the Party.
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Peasants: Penetration/ Participation and Power
Small peasants are the mass base of CCM and their interests 
the key reference point for many leaders both verbally and 
in practice. However, their actual power has always been 
somewhat problematic.
At one level the struggle against neo-kulaks was waged for 
(not really by except in isolated land shortage areas like 
Ismani near Iringa, cases of traditional quasi-feudal rents 
eg Bukoba and battles for the control of Lake Victoria zone 
cooperatives) small peasants and they have gained by it.
Similarly 'villageisation1 was largely to allow them to organise 
themselves and to have access to government services.
As the opening quote from President Nyerere suggests, there is 
a distinct view by many within CCM that the approach has been 
too paternalistic and bureaucratic. It has often hampered
peasant initiatives and raised questions as to whether peasant
44 * 45access to power and state penetration and surplus extraction was
the underlying goal. Ironically the cases of coercion
surrounding villageisation in some districts, the rather high
handed imposition of village managers and frequent patronising
or overtly authoritarian attitudes by some Party and state
officials have combined with the greater case of self organisation
afforded by villages to raise peasant class consciousness in
many villages. Taking the main line ideology at its face value
(at least tactically) they have sought to alter the power balance
between themselves and officials and to secure more resource
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allocations. Retreat from the broader polity and economy 
(also possible given the objective lack of real rural coercive 
power) seems to have been much less frequent. Objectively 
with village councils, substantial communal activity and 
greater self consciousness of peasants' paid position, morale 
and self image appear to have strengthened. However, to describe 
them as dominant would be blindly romantic.
Wage Earners - Income and Production Relations Issues
Organised wage earners in Tanzania have not been a dominant 
class but have been more self conscious and self assertive than 
peasants. Their position has also been more problematic as 
rapid increases in their personal incomes could worsen overall 
national and especially urban/rural income distribution and 
because before the 1964 military strike (a true military coup 
attempt it was not) trade union leaders had shown signs of 
wanting a more populist, chauvinist strategy than the government 
and Party would countenance.
JUWATA does not self evidently represent or organise workers 
very effectively. Post 1965 minimum wage increases (to protect 
real purchasing power until 1975 and to halt its erosion in 
1980 and 1981) seem to have turned on Treasury initiatives 
and the creation of Workers Councils as employment units 
based participatory bodies to alter production relations on 
Party initiatives. While JUWATA has been active in developing 
employment security and working conditions/ grievance procedures 
(eg Workers Committees), in organising adult education (including 
political) for workers, and in appointing worker directors
-  47 -
(symptomatically at least as often from its own staff as from 
the company in question's workers) its worker level base is 
tenuous and its claim to be controlled by its shop floor 
members very problematic.
Worker self organisation - reflected in and stimulated by 
Mwonaozo ~ has turned on de facto "workers assemblies" led 
by Workers Council members and in CCM workplace branches.
It has not been primarily economistic and its economic 
objections have more often related to fringe benefits (free 
travel to work, hot noon meals, medical care), co-op shops and 
incentive schemes than to wages per se. Achieving respect for 
workers (including self-respect) and a disciplinary system that 
applied to managers as much as to workers (and in the same way) 
have been the dominant short term aims with an actual, effective 
voice in firm planning and operation overtly a significant present, 
as medium-term are in some cases. The clashes on management disrespec 
for workers have normally been over by workers - with state/Party 
backing. The attainment of effective discipline and managers 
had been less operational support and the ways of making worker 
participation an enterprise overall decision taking effective 
(beyond the firms in which management, for whatever reason, backs 
it) have received very limited and not very systematic attention.
A spate of attempted worker direct takeovers of private 
enterprises and a handful of strikes seen as relatively 
privileged worker attempts to exploit quasi-monopolies over 1971-72 
were strongly resisted by the government and Party. The reasons 
turned partly on order and due process and partly - at least in 
the wages cases - on a belief that these particular workers were 
seeking to exploit not to and exploitation. Attempts by 
managers to roll back Workers Council/Mwongozo gains to restore
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authoritarianism have in general failed. Indeed some worker 
leaders at plant level have carefully planned approaches to 
build up Party/state leader backing for specific gains (in 
some cases wholesale managerial changes) by showing reasons w h y - 
eg - Treasury or Parliament should have concerns complementary 
to those of workers.
However, the majority of wage workers (in the private sector, 
government units, many parastatals) do not have effective 
Workers Councils or employment unit level organisation.
Production and industrial relations have charged but remain 
heavily paternalistic/hierarchial (and in a not inconsiderable 
number of cases oppressive) and very far from participatory 
socialist. Workers as a class do have a deeper consciousness 
than in the past and have somewhat more power (especially to 
protect themselves) but are not a dominant class whether singly 
or together with peasants. (Indeed at typical worker/peasant 
level it is doubtful whether there is any coherent, mass sense 
of mutual class interests beyond the level of slogans.)
Bureaucratic - Managerial Elite - Weakness and Centrality
In sub-class terms the relative power of bureaucrats and managers
either in terms of personal incomes or of ability to direct and
coerce workers and peasants has declined since 1967 and especially
over 1971-73 and 1975-77. This erosion strongly suggests they
4 6cannot be seen as a dominant sub-class. For individuals - at
least until 1973 - advance in respect of both real income and 
power was quite possible given generally rapid promotion; since 
1973 erosion has affected most individuals.
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This is a somewhat surprising objective trend. Managers/ 
bureaucrats are a relatively self conscious class and are well 
aware that they - as a group - are essential to the functioning 
of the state. They have - in a majority of cases - sought 
to limit increases in worker and peasant participation and power.
One reason is probably that many managers and bureaucrats have 
internalised substantial elements of the main line ideology.
They certainly oppose some elements - usually on a case by 
case not a general principle basis - but wish to be perceived 
as critics within the main stream not proponents of a systematic 
alternative. How seriously most oppose worker participation is 
unclear - when discussing their problems among themselves the 
participation/discipline set of issues is very much less 
prominent than when talking to "outsiders." They do not have 
a very firm sense of sub-class solidarity - institutional (rather 
than sub-class) loyalties, parastatal - civil services tensions 
and a lack of any instinct to rally round managers/officials of 
other bodies under pressure from workers or peasants are quite 
noticeable. Finally/ few really do see a clear route to a design 
for a better alternative system - even for themselves - than the 
present one and feel' quite certain that they will continue to 
enjoy well above average income, status and power under any 
likely evolution of the main line ideology.
Capitalists/Rentiers - Contraction, When and How Far
At independence there were no substantial African capitalists 
and rentiers. While their numbers grew to 1967 they were still 
minute and African capital was a minor fraction of domestic, let
domestic and international, capital in Tanzania. Citizen Asian 
and external capital had - in practice -no way to make alliances 
with other sub-classes (not even, at those dates, with African 
capital because of their historic - and to a degree continuing - 
exclusion of Africans).
Party/state attitudes toward capitalists since 1967 have fluctuated 
moderately, but around four main themes:
a. in the long run there is no place for large and medium-scale 
capitalist enterprises in Tanzania;
b. the state directly productive sector must consolidate and main­
tain its dominance at the level of large and medium-scale 
economic activity;
c. in the medium-term private capital can play useful roles in 
small and medium-scale production (especially industry), 
specialised distribution and joint ventures requiring inputs 
the state cannot otherwise acquire;
e. within the limits of "b" and "c" relatively friendly, if also
frank, negotiations leading to operations of the private sector 
useful to Tanzanian development with a socialist orientation 
are possible.
This approach - combined with the objective weakness of domestic 
capital - has meant that since the 1967 nationalisations / clashes 
have been on specific issues (normally lost by the capitalists unless 
the public sector could not, in practice, cope - eg, urban butchers 
were returned to the private sector) and that there has been absolute 
(not relative) growth of domestic private capital. The opportunities 
which the post-1978 crisis has created for exploitation in the 
colloquial sense may break this truce - at least in respect to major 
fractions of domestic capital - but do not alter the fact that the
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class is very weak politically, especially as it lacks any serious 
symbiotic links with foreign capital.
Rentiers - in the Tanzanian context, landlords - have been viewed
with less favour by TANU/CCM with the exception of elderly persons
owning a limited amount of rental accommodation to provide a de 
47facto pension. 1971 legislation virtually eliminated large-scale 
private landlordism (albeit with more evident results in limiting 
cross exploitation among upper-income groups than either benefits 
to workers and peasants, or to state revenue). While some has 
crept back on a limited scale, that remains the broad picture.
Intellectuals - Sub-class? Class Spokesman? Illusionists?
Whether intellectuals are a sub-class is somewhat problematic.
They can be the analysts, apologists and among the leaders of quite 
different sub-classes but that is a different type of statement.
In Tanzania many university faculty and some journalists would see 
themselves as constituting an intellectual class. University 
students tend to identify with this class while students, but not 
subsequently.
Objectively, by Tanzanian standards, that sub-class is on average
well paid,subject to very lax discipline, allowed substantial
48freedom of expression and not very productive. It is often 
perceived as a bureaucratic/managerial sub-class without any real 
responsibilities (albeit also with very little power and - as a 
sub-class if such it be - relatively little influence). Its own 
perception is that it is not respected enough and that its potential 
analytical and leadership roles are thwarted.
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In fact, except when acting to protect material interests, this 
sub-class is highly fragmented. A majority are basically apolitical 
or passive supporters of the main-line ideology. A minority are 
active main-line Ujamaa ideology supporters and involved in 
advisory, analytical and critical roles, often of substantial 
influence. A minority (possibly smaller than the second but much 
more vocal, strident and bent on intimidating intellectuals who 
dsiagree with it) form the core of the left authoritarian counter 
ideology. By their demand for power without validation by workers 
or peasants, they have forfeited much of the substantial influence 
they had over 1967-69. The Tanzanian state and Party have very 
substantial respect for intellectual skills and substantial 
tolerance of intellectual eccentricities, but very little for 
would-be self-appointed Platonic Guardians of the right or left, 
external or internal.
Women: Subordination, Consciousness, Access
Women are socially, politically and economically subordinated in 
Tanzania in ways that for certain purposes make it useful to view 
them as a class. The main-line Ujamaa ideology does not deal 
directly with the issues of female subordination in any detail, but 
some of its elements do have positive implications for liberation of 
women.
The Party in fact apparently provided the initial breakthrough for 
women into public life and - via its women's league (now UWT)- the 
first chance of self-organisation. How conscious of their par­
ticular class interests as women this participation made them is 
much more doubtful. Certainly TANU did not press for, nor obtain 
substantial numbers of women leaders in state, parastatals or Party.
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Further, UWT tended for many years to be organised and led wholly 
by upper middle-class women (often wives of prominent leaders) and 
to relate somewhat exigously to the concerns of worker and peasant 
women. Overt public sector job discrimination against women was 
only eliminated after the Arusha Declaration, and after it was 
pointed out by a handful of leaders and technocrats (largely men) 
that it seemed inconsistent with the declaration, not as an initial 
main principle or programme component.
Over the past fiftenn years significant changes have occurred:
a. the emphasis on rural water supply is highly beneficial to women 
whose time is saved thereby (albeit interestingly also very 
strongly backed by men) and the growing village woodlot campaign, 
if successful, will have a similar impact;
b. rapid movement toward universal literacy and primary education 
disproportionately benefits women because of their much lower 
initial literacy and school attendance rates;
c. the proportion of women in middle-level posts has risen (and 
that in middle-level training programmes even more) but is 
still below 20%, in top-level managerial/bureaucratic positions 
it is under 10%;
d. villageisation has assisted rural women's self-organisation and 
has apparently caused somewhat greater realisation that 
effective extension work must relate to women as well as men;
e. two competent women ministers were appointed in 1975 (interest­
ingly not to traditional "women's" Ministries) and have been 
retained, while (largely in the appointed and - intriguingly - 
the indirectly elected categories) the per cent of women M P 's 
has climbed to about 10, and that on local councils and com­
mittees to perhaps 20;
e. women's organisations - both under the UWT umbrella and outside 
it - have become more oriented to "women's issues" and somewhat 
more worker and peasant oriented and - at local level - led, 
while at least one significant national voluntary organisation 
(family planning)has a dominantly female leadership.
It is noticeable that many of these changes do not result from 
self-conscious organisation and struggle by women. Some - eg the 
basic service programmes - have rarely been perceived in terms of 
male/female issues. Women's status and self-image has improved. 
Their access to incomes and control over their earnings remains 
sharply inferior to that of men but less so than in 1961, 1967 or 
1973. In urban areas this has created a distinct sub-class of 
women workers who have semi-permanent social relations with men 
but outside marriage or a single household, apparently to achieve 
control over their incomes and head of household status. How 
common or how rapidly growing this pattern is remains unclear - it 
is certainly a minority one. Men's perception of "women's roles" 
also seems to have changed in that the idea of women in almost any 
non-military and non-religious position is not not seen as per se 
implausible by large numbers (a majority?) of Tanzanian men.
-  55 -
Crisis and Response
Any overall approach to Tanzanian polity and ideology at less than 
volume length will give an inadequate sense of change, and especially 
of the process of change. How the state and Party have responded 
to (and built on the basis of those responses to) crises in the past 
is relevant both for understanding how Tanzania moved from 1961 
to 1981 and for identifying possible directions of change in and 
after 1982.
In 1961 at independence both state and Party were weak and brittle. 
The very unusual response was for President (then Prime Minister) 
Nyerere to leave office to work full-time for a year reconstructing 
the Party base and leadership consciousness. In 19 6 2 the conundrum 
(if not crisis) of securing actually contested elections and open 
debate was resolved by creating a one-party state with contested 
elections. The 1964 quasi-coup attempt (and believed trade union 
fringe relationships to it) led to radical restructuring and 
politicisiation of both the armed ofrces and trade unions, but also 
to much more systematic attention to and speeding-up of 
Tanzanianisation, and of increased job security and worker influence 
over working conditions and grievance procedures.
By 1966 the failure of classic social democracy and a relatively 
liberal economic policy to reduce inequality, meet basic needs or 
lay a foundation for stable development was increasingly clear.
The Arusha Declaration response of nationalisation to give the 
public sector a dominant role, the leadership code to place a 
divide between statal, parastatal and Party elected and appointed 
leaders and private business, emphasis on self-reliance (especially, 
though not solely, in terms of outlook) and enhanced domestic
resource mobilisation was prompt, effectively followed up and
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creative. (It was also - as was clearer at the time than in retro­
spect, a high-risk strategy.) In 1971 the Amin coup and its 
blatant appeals to the most chauvinistic and racist strands of 
populism were perceived as a threat to Tanzania's non-racial and 
semi-consensual ethos, especially in a context of growing sub-class 
consciousness. The Mwangozo - which do not actually mention the 
Amin model at all - responded to the internal contradicion and 
external ideological threat by formulating a notably more radical 
and contradiction-conscious set of operating guidelines centred on 
participation, priority to workers and peasants and redressing 
exploitative social and production relations (as well as ownership) 
patterns.
The 1974 crisis turned on drought and external (especially oil and 
grain) price changes. The response included a coherent, austerity 
strategy to sustain development momentum, limit real income losses 
to minimum wage earners and peasants, and to restructure the 
economy to reduce external dependence and vulnerability to shocks.
It also included speeding-up universal literacy, adult education, 
primary schooling and access to pure water programmes, as well as 
completing villageisation and a legislative basis for village 
self-government. While the actual crisis management strategy 
adopted in 1974 and pursued successfully over 1974-76 was not 
broadly participatory in formulation, it was carefully and con­
vincingly explained,(not simply imposed) while the parallel measures 
were all the subject of broadly-based dialogue at all levels in 
the Party.
In 1978 the Amin invasion created a brief fear that the state 
might be overthrown, and following the return to Kagera (and the 
discovery of the massacres) both an intense feeling of national
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unity and a mass demand to hit back - "Bring back the head of the 
Great Snake" as the quite spontaneous mass demonstrations chanted. 
The cautious, low-key management of the war (which only became a 
commitment to help Ugandans liberate their country when there 
were mass welcomes for Tanzanians engaged in tactical attacks, and 
only too believable Amin threats to kill everyone in the districts 
concered) was both politically and militarily far from moving 
blindly, or giving in to mass demands, as opposed to regaining 
leadership and leading on a rather different route.
The 1979 crisis was again economic. It had the same external shock 
elements as 1974 plus the bill for repelling Amin and supporting 
the liberation of Uganda. In addition, 1977-79 had been Tanzania's 
only period of fiscal laxity, and most pronounced one of managerial 
indiscipline (or laxity) leading to very substantial real resource 
wastes. The lag in producing an initial strategy was greater, the 
participation again narrow and explanation and mobilisation in 
support of it - like the strategy - somewhat more lagged and frag­
mentary than in 1974. Appeals to restore efficiency by restoring 
authoritarian discipline (ie "repealing" Mwongozo) which had grown 
over 1975-1978 were firmly rejected. Dialogue and discussion 
toward restoring district-level elective bodies and peasant-based 
co-op structures beyond village level were speeded up with 1982/83 
set for implementation. Basic service maintenance and expansion 
was reaffirmed as a goal, and minimum wage increases to avert real 
purchasing power losses restored (in 1981 after a five year gap) 
despite harsh overall fiscal austerity.
This record suggests three things about how the Tanzanian system 
responds to crises:
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a. in general participation and eqalitarianism are broadened, or
at the least defended, rather than curtailed;
b. efforts are made to use the crisis to institute measures that
overcome a secondary contradiction and lay a base for further 
advance after the crisis, not merely to take action necessary 
for immediate systemic survival;
c. however, the immediate crisis response economic packages do
not tend to be broadly participatory (partly at least because of
time constraints) despite detailed subsequent explanations and
some of the eqalitarian/basic needs/participatory programmes
are in part, at least, implemented by authoritarian means
(notably villageisation, albeit that experience has probably led
to closer central Party/state monitoring to avoid "over-
49enthusiastic" decentralised implementation ).
Fairly clearly, there is a distinct tension - at times contradiction 
- between the first and third characteristics. To date, it has 
been resolved largely in favour of the first - advances in partici­
pation and access tend to stick, incursions of authoritarianism 
tend to be reversed. However, because the 1979-?? crisis is longer 
lasting and more severe, it would be naive to ignore the danger 
of reversal of that pattern, just as it would be most imprudent to 
talk of the long-term gains from 1979-81 crisis management measures 
until it is clear that they will pass the immediate tests of 
stabilising and restoring a forward dynamic to the economy, which 
they have demonstrably not, or not yet, done as of the second quarter 
of 1982; even though they have averted the imminent collapse which 
appeared to be only months away in the last quarter of 1979.
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Quo Vadis?
Tanzania is currently the object of analytical dirges from left 
centre and right external analysts and experts. Albeit for 
varied (in some cases diametrically opposed) reasons/they foresee 
collapse. While there have been earlier laments for the dying (in 
1967 and 1974/75 in particular), they have never been so numerous 
and uniform . Were Tanzanians to accept them, their logical 
course of action would be that of Empedocles on Aetna. In general, 
Tanzanians - whether workers and peasants or leaders - do not 
accept these voices of doom. What can be said about this clash 
over prospects for the 1980's?
A series of very serious problems can be identified:
1. real import capacity is at best two-thirds what is needed to 
operate the economy at capacity, because over 1961-1979 export 
development (or earned import capacity development) strategy 
was non-existent, and because over 1972-1982 the unit purchasing 
power of exports fell by over 50%;
2. internal inefficiencies in resource use (despite correction of 
the more glaring over 1979-81) compound real resource scarcities 
and - more critically at present - are in many cases made in­
soluble by the foreign exchange constraint;
3. the strategy of "all boats float lower" (egalitarianism and 
defence of basic services in a context of falling real national 
purchasing power) is not a compellingly attractive strategy
to any sub-class, unless a return to "all boats float higher" 
can be foreseen;
4. Because of nearly continuous crises from 1974 (1976-78 was the 
exception) there are distinct erosions of energy, probity and 
morale;
5. Response to crises may become increasingly authoritarian which 
- whether it preserved the state and Party or not - would des­
troy the main-line ideology;
6. The international environment is hostile in respect to the 
impact of the industrial capitalist economy created and con­
tinued depression, the failure to achieve even serious negotia­
tions toward mutually beneficial changes in North-South struc­
tural relations, the geopolitical realities of the South African 
systems' relations with its neighbours.
Objectively it is very difficult to analyse a way forward for
Tanzania and remarkably easy (especially for those with no particular 
commitment to Tanzania, or with Tanzanians) to sketch a plethora 
of scenarios of collapse. Further doubts can be raised about, and 
defects identified in, 1979-81 response once the gravity of the 
crisis had been perceived. Self-criticism and analysis has been 
fairly searching and complete, but its depth and emphases may be 
more problematic. Contingency planning has not been adequately 
co-ordinated, acted on promptly enough, nor explained effectively 
(in terms of viability and potential results, as well as of what to
do) to those called on to act in support of its implementation.
Mobilisation is very unequal and some facile attempts - eg, most 
compulsory acreage requirements for peasants - have little positive 
impact, raise divisive tensions and corrode the basis for genuine 
mobilisation.
However, an opposite set of points can be made;
1. morale is surprisingly high, given the context - a dogged
determination to push forward, a commitment to overcoming par­
ticular obstacles and at least a half-faith that success is 
possible, are far commoner in Tanzania than cynicism or despair;
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2. 1979-81 saw a remarkable improvement in policy and performance 
especially in respect to efficiency of scarce resource alloca­
tion and use - without it, the economy would have seized up like 
an unlubricated engine by the middle of 1980;
3. the physical production record is reasonably good (about 5% a 
year in quantity terms over the 1970's) and could be improved 
were foreign resources to be secured to break bottlenecks and 
restore capacity utilisation;
4. the substantial 1961-77 gains in - eg, life expectancy, nutrition, 
basic services - have, to date, been preserved;
5. the actual 1979-81 trend has, if anything, been to more con­
sultation and participation rather than to authoritarianism;
6. Tanzania has fought its way through crises before, eg the 1974 
international economic crisis, the 1978 Amin invasion when 
cold analysis from objective data suggested a very high risk of 
failure.
The future both in terms of the survival of state and Party and of 
positive evolution of the main-line ideological position, is 
problematic. Problematic, not hopeless.
For the analytical forecaster the best guide may be cautionary - 
Pliny's "ex Africa aliquod semper novae". For the analyst committed 
to Tanzania and Tanzanians, or to what Tanzania is attempting, a 
paraphrase of Gramsci may be a more appropriate guide to analysis 
and action - pessism of the intellect, optimism of the will.
NOTES
1. This paper covers Mainland Tanzania (99% of area and 98% of 
population) only because Zanzibar and Pemba (the other partner 
in the United Republic) is significantly different in many 
respects. Since 1972 and especially since unification of the 
two single parties in 1977 there has been a considerable shift 
by Zanzibar toward positions and conditions similar to those 
of the Mainland, but the divergences are great enough to make 
coverage in a single paper impracticable - especially as the 
author has quite limited knowledge of Zanzibar.
2. See Bank of Tanzania 20 Year Political Economic Review and 
R.H. Green, "Political Economic Adjustment and IMF Condition­
ality" cited in Methodological Note for fuller presentation.
3. "Ndio, bwana" is also a safe answer to an order or instruction 
but, by itself, gives little clue to what the respondent will 
do.
4. Presumably the goals posited are those of the author. However 
valid they may be, analysis which supposes them to be Tanzania' 
goals when they are not,creates confusion.
5. Tanzanian political thought and action does not seem to have 
been deeply influenced by Fabianism.
6. This has been a recurrent problem - an abnormally high propor­
tion (by no means all) of the verbally hard left have recanted 
and/or defected over the 1961-81 period with Ugandan leaders 
(ex-leaders) like Nabuaere and Tandon who has been prominent 
University of Dar es Salaam left authoritarian critics of main 
line Ujamaa among the recent examples.
7. Usually but not always. The campaign for rental buidlings 
(more accurately large landlord) nationalisation was in quite 
harsh class conflict terms. But then again, that was - as it 
evolved - basically a populist not a Marxist initiative.
8. This does not necessarily hold of university contributions to 
dialogue, debate and criticism.
9. In the President's case his initial major reading of these 
works was over 1966-70.
10. Doubtless Tanzanian perceptions have been coloured by Kenya's 
famous Sessional Paper No. 10, African Socialism which is an 
apologia for capitalism red in tooth and claw and dominated 
by foreign capital.
11. Not including hero-worship of the national leader to which 
President Nyerere is highly allergic.
12. The key actions were in cutting neo-kulak links to political 
power, professional officials and economic instutitons rather 
than in any general squeezing of individual large, wage labour 
employing farmers.
- b -
13. That fact has led to somewhat confused criticism. Production 
socialists (and their capitalist analogues such as Eliot Berg) 
view serious resource allocations to basic consumption and 
service needs as whimsical. Either they assume the assertions 
are false - hiding real accumulation and production methods - 
or they criticism them as self-evidently unsound. A well 
publicised case turned on the Dar es Salaam automated bakery 
actually built to meet a proletarian demand to curb bread 
adulteration and short-weighting (see R.H. Green, The Automated 
Bakery - A Study of Decision Taking Goals, Processes and 
Problems In Tanzania, Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) 
Discussion Paper No. 141, 1978. A recent production socialist 
critique is A.M. Babu's "Production before prestige", Guardian 
Third World Review, 23-IV-82.
14. Prices paid for public sector marketed crops grew 5% faster
than the prices of urban goods while the urban minimum wage 
grew a third less rapidly, ie a 38% improvement in peasant/ 
minimum wage-earner gross barter terms of trade.
15. This may be debateable - right critics argue that egalitarianism
in decision taking/rejecting power has grown spectacularly and
disastrously, and many peasants and workers that it has grown 
substantially and desirably.
16. The fact that intellectual criticism was of over-emphasis on 
exports when in fact less than 10% of investment and 2-3% of 
recurrent spending was so directed did not help.
17.. It also benefits from expatriate domestic and external intel­
lectual support.
18. Managers and bureaucrats do_ believe this power has been wrested 
from them by Party action and its return blocked by worker/ 
peasant struggle backed by the Party and some elements of the 
state apparatus.
19. Arguably the 1971 reversal of a tentative decision to end 
private secondary schools (as private medical practice had been 
ended) and to drop the parents1 association (basically a 
private school lobby by 1977 as a Party affiliate) was a later 
and successful battle. However, it was an issue which the 
leadership did not see as central, the private school con­
stituency included many managers-officials-politicians who 
were otherwise main-line supporters, the final decision 
increased state control over, and power to block, further 
expansion of private secondary schools.
20. There have been actual disqualifications on each ground.
21. In general these were neo-kulak centred regional counter­
conditions capturing Party units.
22. The ultimate power of the Party is to expel M P 1s as Party 
members which automatically disqualifies them as M P 1s .
23. Party personnel are paid on the state salary scale.
24. The refusal is by no means uniform - many managers and officials 
fear (or respect) the power behind serious Party intervention.
- c -
25. At least that is the impression given by listening either to 
those who have lost by such actions or those who believe they 
have gained from them.
26. See Bank of Tanzania volume (o£ cit); R.H. Green, D.G. Rwegasira, 
B.Van Arkadie, Economic Shocks and National Policy Making,
B.U. Mwansasu and C. Pratt, Towards Socialism in Tanzania, 
cited in Methodological Note for much fuller discussion.
27. The largest (and least odd) is housing provided at a fixed 
fraction (12 % %) of gross income. Others are use of insti­
tutional vehciles, rather frequent institutional entertaining 
with hosts outnumbering guests, and exchange (at offical 
prices but with preferential access) of scarce goods or 
services among managers of their producers.
28. In fact, the political decision was to hold a trial rather 
than an inquiry, not to procure a conviction whatever the 
evidence.
29. Four assessors sit with judges on major cases. However, the 
judge can overrule them on points of fact as well as of law, 
albeit this is rare in practice.
30. Doubtless an improper statement but one flowing from a real 
desire to protect independence of the judiciary from this judge.
31. Including detentions related to Zanzibar plots and one against 
a liberation movement.
32. When the original Ordinance was adopted before independence 
these were clearly not seen as threats to national security. 
However, the wording is general so that reading it to include 
national economic security today does not appear unreasonable.
33. Nil strictly political, a handful of "economic sabotage" cases.
34. The detention of 5,000 accused cattle thieves was in principle
to await trial. When it became evident that such a large 
number of accused simply could not be tried in good time, they 
were released (about six months after arrest).
35. Despite very high maximum prison terms and fines and semi- 
compulsory foreiture of assets involved.
36. Indeed when the author's piece "The Survival Plan That Continues 
to Buy Time" (Guardian, 23-111-82)was reprinted in that slot, 
several friends inquired what was so unfairly critical in it,
so used were they to violent root and branch assaults being 
printed there.
37. The present author is a very poor evaluator of general access
for researchers because he receives preferential access.
38. They have not been very systematically researched and are not 
an area of expertise of the present author.
39. They are basically equal partnerships of small, self-employed 
capitalists in the production cases and neighbourhood buying 
groups in the retail ones.
- d -
40. But see G. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa cited in Methodological Note.
41. This was an assocation of small communal villages with an
ideological basis which was an old amalgam of Emerson and 
Marcuse and with very significant external intellectual 
and technical leadership. While at one time influential in 
shaping ideas for launching Ujamaa Villages, the RDA came into 
sharp conflict with the Regional Party and was banned at the 
turn of the decade.
.42. This danger is much less acute today. Tanzaniaris are by and
large willing to consider individuals as such even vhen they
hold stereotypes about the groups to which they belong. But 
in 1960/61 then Chief Minister Nyerere had to threaten to 
retire from politics to block anti-Asian limitations being 
inserted in the citizenship legislation.
43. Tanzania has not been as acutely worried about fifth columns
as Mozambique (with good reason in both cases). "Nous sommes
trahis" is not a Tanzanian leitmotif.
44. See Hyden, 0£  cit but also J. Jiggins highly critical review
in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 3-1, 1981.
45. In fact both on state and household cash flow accounts the 
peasant sector is a net recipient of funds, not a source of 
surplus. Data collected and analysed by J. Wagao in 1981 
University of Sussex PhD thesis on income distribution in 
Tanzania.
46. But see I. Shivji, J.Saul, T.Szentes, W.Rodney in Cliffe and 
Saul, Socialism in Tanzania, cited in Methodological Note 
for a fuller debate on this issue.
47. Politically this was prudent; many TANU elders were in precisely 
that position. Administratively it was necessary; tens of 
thousands of room lets in thousands of traditional urban houses 
could not have been handled. In terms of mitigating exploita­
tion of the poor it was less satisfactory - these landlords 
often do have a high rate of return on investment.
48. Eg, the student-staff ratio at the university is under 4 to 1, 
while average output of seminar papers or more widely repro­
duced/published materials averages about 1.5 per faculty 
member per year.
49. The pace of villageisation - which led to many of the technical 
failings and most of the coercion - was not centrally planned. 
The Party Congress envisaged a 1974-1977 programme, not a 
1974-75. Nor was the speedup bureaucratically initiated,
most civil servants were not enthusiastic about village creation 
and certainly had no desire to double their workload by acting 
ahead of their existing (in many regions) draft plans. The 
main instigators were a handful of Party/government adminis­
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METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
This paper has been written with an abnormally slim overt critical 
apparatus. This demands an explanation to the reader.
1. The author has been in Tanzania repeatedly from 1964 to date 
and has observed many of the events and processes cited 
first-hand.
2. He has also relied heavily on direct personal contacts with 
a wide range of Tanzanians (usually not in the format of 
research interviews) which are an even more major body of 
source material. Both brevity and the fact that these 
dsicussions were rarely with any view to publication by either 
party counsel against detailed source citation.
3. Much Tanzanian officials material is not secret as to substance 
- or indeed unavailable to an outside researcher who is persis­
tent, establishes a relation of trust and can locate the 
relevant institutional resting places. Unfortunately for 
academic purposes much of it is in files or documents other 
folios or paragraphs of which are confidential or secret, so 
that they may not properly be cited, even though most of their 
contents may be used.
4. Pressure of time - and possibly of estimated reader attention - 
has prevented a full-scale bibliography.
5. However, a few relevant sources of general usefulness can be 
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